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Abstract
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making
public oﬃcials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand,
accountablity allows the public to screen and discipline their oﬃcials; on the other,
it may induce those oﬃcials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight
on minority welfare.
We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly
(direct democracy), to accountable oﬃcials (called “politicians”), or to nonaccount-
able oﬃcials (called “judges”).
Keywords: Accountability, pandering, separation of powers, constitutional de-
sign, redistributive politics, minority rights. (JEL:H 1 ,H 7 ,K 4 ) .
The premise behind democracy is that public decisions should reﬂect the will of the
people. But in most democracies, comparatively few decisions are made directly by the
public.1 More often, the power to decide is delegated to representatives. And there is a
good reason for this delegation: representatives are usually expected to do a better job.2
As specialists in public decision-making, they are more likely than the average citizen
to have the experience, judgment, and information to decide wisely.3 In any case, they
have greater incentive than the citizen to try to do so. After all, in any large society, a
1lone citizen will have strong temptation to free-ride, since her chance of actually aﬀecting
policy is almost negligible.4
Another potential advantage of representative government is that it reduces the risk
of “tyranny by the majority.” Noting the dangers of direct democracy5, Madison (1787)
writes: “It is of great importance...to guard one part of the society against the injustice
of the other part. Diﬀerent interests necessarily exist in diﬀerent classes of citizens. If
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”
But if representatives decide for the public, what induces them to act in the public
interest? In this paper we focus on two motivations in particular.
First, we suppose that an oﬃcial wishes to leave a legacy, i.e., she wants to be re-
membered for great things. Indeed, in our set-up, it is not enough for the oﬃcial that
great things be done; she wants to be the one who does them (although we allow for
the possibility that her conception of what is “great” may diﬀer from that of the average
citizen, that is, she may be noncongruent with society).6
But the desire to use power to achieve certain ends is not the only motive we ascribe
to the oﬃcial. We also assume that she values being in oﬃce for its own sake, perhaps
because she enjoys the perquisites that come with the job, perhaps because she simply
has a taste for wielding inﬂuence.7
The public can harness these two motives by making the oﬃcial accountable,t h a ti s ,b y
requiring her to run for reelection every so often. Holding reelections creates two major
potential beneﬁts. First, it may induce an oﬃcial who is otherwise inclined (because
she is noncongruent with society) to act in the public interest. Because the electorate
may not always be able to evaluate the oﬃcial’s actions directly, this can be called the
“moral-hazard-correcting” beneﬁt of accountablity. Second, reelections may allow the
electorate to “weed out” the noncongruent oﬃcials altogether This can be viewed as the
“adverse-selection-correcting” eﬀect.
But accountability also carries with it two serious possible drawbacks. In order to get
reelected, an oﬃcial may choose an action, not because it is right for society, but because
2it is popular. That is, she may pander to public opinion. Although some might call such
pandering “responsiveness,”8 it is in clear conﬂict with the rationale for representative
democracy discussed above: that representatives can make better decisions than ordinary
citizens.9 Furthermore, if minority rights are a concern, the ability to remove oﬃcials from
oﬃce through elections may give the majority too much power to shape the government.
A constitution–a speciﬁcation of who gets to decide what–should strike a balance
between these considerations. In this paper, we compare constitutions from the stand-
point of public welfare. We focus mainly on three diﬀerent modes for making decisions:
(i) direct democracy, in which the public itself decides through a referendum; (ii) rep-
resentative democracy,i nw h i c ha no ﬃcial subject to reelection (a “politician”) decides;
and (iii) judicial power, in which a nonaccountable oﬃcial (a “ judge”) decides.10 We
also show that, in our admittedly extremely simple basic model, the welfare-maximizing
constitution generally reduces to one of these three modes (or a combination thereof).
Of course, the requirement that oﬃcials run for reelection is not only the only form
of accountability in political life. After all, most appointed oﬃcials are accountable to
their supervisors. Electoral accountability, however, is more straightforward to analyze;
it avoids the need to model the motivations and beliefs of the supervisors.
I. Overview
A. Outline
In section II, we set out a two-period model with a homogeneous electorate. In each
period, there is a decision to be made between two possible actions. One action is “pop-
ular” in the sense that the electorate believes it to be optimal with better than fair odds.
The electorate will either decide itself (direct democracy) or delegate the decision to an
oﬃcial, who knows which action is optimal. Each oﬃcial is either congruent (i.e., she has
the same preferences as the electorate) or noncongruent with society, although ex ante
the electorate does not know which case holds. She also places some weight on holding
oﬃce for its own sake. In the case of delegation, the ﬁrst-period oﬃcial will either stand
for reelection just before period 2 (in the case of representative democracy), or remain
3in oﬃce automatically for the second period (the case of judicial power). There may be
some chance that, before period 2, the electorate learns whether or not the ﬁrst-period
decision was optimal.
I ns e c t i o nI I I ,w ea n a l y z et h i sm o d e lf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h e r ei sno chance that the
electorate learns about the optimality of the ﬁrst-period decision before period 2. For this
“no feedback” case we show, in subsection III, A, that the comparison of our three modes
of government turns on the strength of oﬃcials’ oﬃce-holding motive. When this motive
is strong, politicians always pander to public opinion 11(choose the popular action), and
so the best form of government (among the three) is either direct democracy or judicial
power (depending on how much the electorate knows ex ante about the optimal action).
When it is weak, then politicians always act on their legacy motivation, and elections oﬀer
some possibility to screen out noncongruent oﬃcials. Hence, in that case, representative
democracy dominates judicial power (but still could be inferior to direct democracy if the
public has a good idea ex ante of the optimal action). These considerations suggest that
decisions of suﬃciently great importance (ones for which the legacy motive is likely to
dominate) are best taken by politicians rather than by judges (although these may also
be decisions for which direct democracy fares better still).
In subsection III, B we expand the set of possible governmental systems to include
a n ys c h e m ei nw h i c ht h ed e c i s i o no nw h e t h e rt or e t a i naﬁrst-period oﬃcial depends
on the ﬁrst-period action. We argue that when the oﬃce-holding motive is strong, no
mechanism in this broader class dominates judicial power or direct democracy (assuming
that the public cannot commit itself to a random election). When it is weak, however, a
“hybrid” mechanism in which an unpopular oﬃcial is replaced by direct democracy could
be optimal.
Subsections III, C - III, F consider several extensions. Subsection III, C makes it
costly for an oﬃcial to ﬁnd out which action is best for her or for society and argues that
a politician is less likely to incur that expense than a judge. We conclude that highly
technical decisions are best taken by judges. Subsection III, D examines the issue of
4term lengths and points out that optimally they should balance the transition costs of
replacing oﬃcials (which make longer terms desirable) and the electorate’s risk-aversion
(which argues for shorter terms). Subsection III, E asks whether politicians or judges
should have more discretionary power, and suggests that politicians should have the edge
because their decisions convey useful information to the public, unlike those of judges.
Finally, subsection III, F takes up the possibility of campaign promises and argues that,
depending on how badly oﬃcials want to hold oﬃce, this can be either a boon or a bane.
In section IV, we consider the case in which, with positive probability, the electorate
learns whether or not the ﬁrst-period decision was optimal before period 2. We show
that, if the oﬃce-holding motive is strong, there are two (mutually exclusive) alternatives
to the full pandering equilibrium we obtain in section III: either (i) oﬃcials always choose
the optimal action in the ﬁrst period (if the probability of feedback is suﬃciently high),
or (ii) there is some chance that a noncongruent oﬃcial will pander (a good thing) but
otherwise oﬃcials act on their legacy motive (if the probability of feedback is moderate).
Finally, in section V, we introduce the possibility of conﬂict between majority and
minority preferences and show that representative democracy may do a better job than
either direct democracy or judicial power when the probability that minority preferences
should prevail is only moderate, but that judicial power is superior if the risk of minority
oppression is suﬃciently large. We interpret the U.S. Constitution as a device for switching
control from elected to appointed oﬃcials when minority rights are jeopardized.
B. Related literature
This paper borrows from several literatures. Our analysis of representative democracy
builds on the theory of elections as a disciplining device (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986,
and chapters 4 and 9 of Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 2000). These are models
of political agency, in which voters are ex post indiﬀerent about whom they vote for,12
and in which the reelection motive may induce elected oﬃcials to behave in congruence
with the electorate’s wishes. Our departures are the introduction of (i) pandering, which
is possible because the electorate has only imperfect knowledge of the optimal policy,
5and (ii) adverse selection which arises from oﬃcials’ legacy motive and the possibility of
noncongruence.
The role of citizens’ initiatives as a form of direct democracy is studied in Besley and
Coate (2000a,b) and Matsusaka (1992). The latter paper provides an empirical analysis of
871 Californian ballot propositions and shows that politicians tend to leave distributional
issues to the public and to tackle “good government” issues themselves.
Speciﬁc points made in this paper relate to disparate parts of the political economy
literature. The notion that representative democracy gives rise to dynamic screening of
politicians is reminiscent of Juan Carrillo and Thomas Mariotti (2001)’s more general
study of dynamic selection of leadership within a party. Papers by Jean-Jacques Laﬀont
and David Martimort (1999), Laﬀont (1999), Persson et al (1997), and Mathias Dewa-
tripont and Tirole (1999) present arguments for separation of powers that diﬀer from our
pandering argument.
Work on the rationale for unaccountability (as opposed to unaccountability’s conse-
quences) is sparse. Much of the literature starting with Kenneth Rogoﬀ (1985) emphasizes
the beneﬁt of having independent central bankers with preferences diﬀerent from those
of the electorate as a commitment device vis a vis markets. Antione Faure-Grimaud and
Denis Gromb (2000) show that agency independence stabilizes policies when bureaucra-
cies are captured by the industry. Matthew McCubbins et al (1987) stress the ex ante
control of agencies.
In its emphasis on welfare analysis, constitutional choice, and length of tenure, our
paper is perhaps most closely related to the literature on posturing in corporate ﬁnance.
This literature has argued that the threat of takeovers, liquidation, or replacement induces
managers to adopt short-termist attitudes. They accordingly select ineﬃcient investments
that pay oﬀ quickly (e.g., Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden 1995, Dewatripont and Maskin
1995, and Jeremy Stein 1989) or induce income and dividend smoothing (e.g., Drew
Fudenberg- and Tirole 1995). The analysis of intraparty competition in Bernard Caillaud
and Tirole (2002) also stresses the impact of entrenchment and competition for leadership
6in a mechanism-design framework. Christopher Avery and Margaret Meyer (2000) study
the reliability of recommendations by an evaluator who may be biased in favor of the agent
to be evaluated and hired. An evaluator with career concerns may want to be tough to
preserve her reputation vis-a-vis the principal. While career concerns always beneﬁtt h e
principal in the basic model, Avery and Meyer identify conditions, in particular on the
correlation of the evaluator’s preferences over time, under which reputational incentives
are harmful.13
A phenomenon somewhat akin to pandering arises in Stephen Morris (2001), who
examines a model in which an informed advisor is supposed to provide information to an
uninformed principal with the same preferences. Morris shows that, despite the coincident
preferences, the advisor may refrain from conveying her information truthfully if doing
so might jeopardize her reputation with the principal (e.g., increase the possibility that
the principal thinks that she is a “racist”). As in our model, this has the adverse welfare
eﬀect of possibly destroying useful information.
Finally, Brandice Canes-Wrone et al (2001) analyze a career-concern model of political-
incumbent policy choice in which, as in our model, the incumbent has policy expertise
and there is a positive probability of feedback before the reelection date. However, Canes-
Wrone et al focus on a quite diﬀerent set of issues. In particular, the incumbent attempts
to signal talent (a high-quality oﬃcial’s information is better than that of a low-quality
oﬃcial) rather than congruence, and so the redistributive issues studied in section V below
do not arise. Also, the Canes-Wrone et al model takes accountability as given and so does
not broach the tenure issue that ﬁgures so prominently in our paper.
II. The basic model
T h e r ea r et w op e r i o d s ,1a n d2 ,a n dap a i r{a,b} of possible actions in each period.
[We give these actions the same labels in both periods only for notational convenience.
In fact, they should be thought of as diﬀerent between periods, and not necessarily as
describable ex ante.]
In this basic model, all voters have the same preference ranking14 of the two actions,
7but do not know ex ante what this ranking is. The optimal action–the action that
voters would favor if they knew their ranking– is drawn at random independently in





,w h i c hi sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g ef o r
the electorate. Thus, a is the “popular” action (in the sense that it would be chosen if
t h ee l e c t o r a t ed i dt h ec h o o s i n gi t s e l f ) ,a n db the “unpopular” one. The parameter p is
a measure of how much the electorate knows about the issue15.T w o f a c t o r s i n ﬂuence
the value of p: technicality and familiarity. Technicality–the degree to which the issue
requires specialized knowledge, say of economics or science–tends to reduce the value of
p. By contrast, familiarity–how much exposure the electorate has had to this sort of
question–will raise p (we would classify issues that are largely matters of basic values as
“familiar”).
We suppose that the electorate is interested in maximizing its expected utility. For
most of the paper (but see subsection III, D) we will assume that the electorate obtains
ap a y o ﬀ of 2 if the actions chosen in both periods are optimal, a payoﬀ of 1 if just one
action is optimal, and a zero payoﬀ if neither is. That is, the electorate is “risk neutral.”
Unless the constitution speciﬁes direct democracy, the period 1 decision is delegated to





,t h eo ﬃcial is “congruent” ; that is, her preference
ranking is the same as the voters would have, if they were fully informed. With probability
1−π,t h eo ﬃcial is “non-congruent”17; her preferred action diﬀers from that of electorate.18
The parameter π can be interpreted as both a description of the underlying pool of
candidates, which for now we will take to be exogenous– but see the discussion at the
end of section IV–and as a measure of the electorate’s ability to screen oﬃcials.
We suppose that, unlike the electorate, an oﬃcial knows which action is best for her
(and which is best for society). This assumption reﬂects the oﬃcial’s greater incentive
to be well informed (or, alternatively, her greater expertise and resources).
To measure an oﬃcial’s eagerness to hold onto power, we introduce a “notional discount
factor” δ. For example, suppose that the oﬃcial obtains utility G from selecting her
preferred action,19 and utility R simply from being in oﬃce (R may correspond to perks,
8prestige, etc.). If the oﬃcial’s rate of time preference is reﬂected by discount factor β,
then




since the oﬃcial always selects her preferred action when in oﬃce at date 2. Notice that
δ could be either greater or smaller than 1.
More generally, the notional discount factor δ is deﬁned as the ratio of the oﬃcial’s
payoﬀ from remaining in oﬃc ei np e r i o d2t ot h a tf r o mc h o o s i n gh e rp r e f e r r e da c t i o ni n
period 1. It could be aﬀected by considerations beyond rent from oﬃce-holding and legacy.
For example, if a displaced oﬃcial derived some beneﬁt from her successor’s choosing her
preferred action, then δ would be somewhat smaller than the above formula suggest. In
principle, δ could also be diﬀerent for congruent and noncongruent oﬃcials (although, for
simplicity, we assume that it is not).
We suppose that before period 2 the electorate learns with probability q whether or
not the ﬁrst-period action was the optimal one. With probability 1 − q, the electorate
learns nothing. Presumably the electoral will eventually ﬁnd out about the optimality
of this action, and so q can be thought of as a measure of the speed at which feedback
accrues.
Provided that direct democracy is not called for in period 2, the electorate can either
maintain the period 1 oﬃcial in oﬃc e( i ti sr e q u i r e dt od os oi ft h eo ﬃcial was granted
at w o - p e r i o dt e r m ) ,o rd r a wan e wo ﬃcial from the pool of candidates (i.e., elect a chal-
lenger). Because oﬃcials always choose their preferred action in period 2, the new oﬃcial
will select the optimal action with probability π.20
III. The no-feedback case
Let us assume in this section that the electorate obtains no feedback about the ﬁrst-
period decision before period 2 (i.e., q =0 ). We ﬁrst compare the three benchmark
institutions (direct democracy representative democracy, and judicial power), next ask
9whether there exists an institution superior to the best of those three, and then go on to
consider several extensions.
A. Comparison of institutions
Direct democracy (DD). Under direct democracy, the decision is determined solely by vot-




Judicial power (JP). Under judicial power, the oﬃcial need not worry about reelection




Representative democracy (RD). There are two cases:
(a) Strong oﬃce-holding motive (δ > 1): When δ > 1, the politician values staying in
oﬃce through period 2 above selecting her preferred action in period 1. In equilibrium, the
politician selects the popular action a regardless of her true preferences and the optimal
action. Voters then reelect her if and only if she chose a.W e c a l l t h i s a full pandering
(FP) equilibrium.21 Notice that voters learn nothing about the politician’s type from her
ﬁrst-period decision, since she always panders. Thus they are, in fact, indiﬀerent between
reelecting and not reelecting her. Equilibrium welfare is
W






This is not surprising since, in this case, representative democracy is tantamount to direct
democracy in period 1 and to unaccountable judicial power in period 2. We conclude that,
10when δ > 1, RD is dominated. The optimal choice between DD and JP turns on whether
p>π or π >p(see case δ > 1 of Figure 1).
(b) Weak oﬃce-holding motive (δ < 1): When δ < 1, the politician chooses her preferred
action in period 1, i.e., there is no pandering. The electorate can now draw inferences
about the politician from this choice. Speciﬁcally, the posterior probability that the
politician’s preferences are congruent with those of the electorate is
πp
πp +( 1− π)(1 − p)
(> π),
when the oﬃcial has chosen a in period 1; and
π(1 − p)
π(1 − p)+( 1− π)p
(< π),
when she has selected b. Thus, in equilibrium, the oﬃcial will be reelected if and only if
she has chosen the popular action. The electorate’s welfare is therefore
WRD = π[1 + p +( 1− p)π]+( 1− π)pπ
= π[1 + π +2 p(1 − π)].
11Representative democracy now strictly dominates judicial power: The two generate the
same ﬁrst-period behavior, but RD allows the electorate to replace an oﬃcial whose
behavior suggests noncongruence. Representative democracy dominates direct democracy
if and only if
(2) 2p<
π(1 + π)
1 − π + π2
(see case δ < 1 of Figure 1). Note that the “boundary”
π(1+π)
2(1−π+π2) = p between RD and
DD in this case is below the corresponding boundary π = p b e t w e e nJ Pa n dD Di nc a s e
δ > 1. That is, DD is more likely to be optimal in case δ > 1 than in case δ < 1.T h i si s
because in the latter case, RD could be optimal even if p>π provided that the welfare
gain from having the opportunity to oust a possibly noncongruent oﬃcial is big enough.
Observe that in the no-feedback case (q =0 ) ,t h eo n l yb e n e ﬁt of accountability is the
possibility of screening out noncongruent oﬃcials. That is, in this case, accountability
does not induce the oﬃcial to act on behalf of the electorate (when δ > 1,t h eo ﬃcial
panders; when δ < 1, she acts in her own interest).
We have implicitly been supposing that all decisions are equally important in the
sense that they deliver the same potential legacy payoﬀ to the oﬃcial. But we can readily
a c c o m m od a t ev a r i a t i o n si nt h i sp a y o ﬀ. Imagine that the legacy payoﬀ i sd r a w ne a c hpe r i od
from a probability distribution with mean G. Suppose that, in period 1 a politician faces
an especially important issue–e.g., whether to go to war–generating potential legacy
payoﬀ G ´ ,w i t hG ´>G .T h e n( i ft h es e c o n dp e r i o di s s u ei sn o ty e tk n o w n )t h en o t i o n a l






and therefore lower than that in (1) (we are focusing only on the ﬁrst-period decision,
because the magnitude of the legacy payoﬀ does not aﬀect second-period behavior). Such
a decision would thus be less likely to generate pandering and therefore more apt to be
best allocated to representative democracy rather than to judicial power (note that the
advantage of RD is not that it leads to better ﬁrst-period decisions than JP but that it
provides an opportunity to screen oﬃcials). We conclude that ceteris peribus decisions
12generating large legacy payoﬀss h o u l db ea s s i g n e dt oRD over JP (for such discriminatory
assignment to be possible, some aspect of the decision must be describable in advance, e.g.,
that it entails whether or not to go to war). Of course, issues that produce large potential
legacy payoﬀs are likely to generate large potential social payoﬀs as well. Notice that if
the social payoﬀ from an optimal ﬁrst-period decision increases, the boundary between
R Da n dD Di nF i g u r e1(δ < 1) would move upwards, that is, RD would be less likely to
generate greater expected welfare than DD. This is because as the ratio of ﬁrst-period to
second-period payoﬀs rises, the comparative beneﬁtf r o mo u s t i n gan o n c o n g r u e n to ﬃcial
after period 1 declines.
B. Mechanism design
Moving beyond the three systems DD, RP and JP, let us consider a more gen-
eral system for public decision-making in which an oﬃcial makes the ﬁrst-period choice
and xa and xb are her probabilities of being reelected after selecting the popular and
unpopular actions, respectively (our model is very simple, and so xa and xb are the only
instruments we have). To obtain an upper bound on social welfare, we ﬁr s ta s s u m et h a t
these probabilities xa and xb are contractible (e.g., that it is somehow possible to write a
constitutional provision that if an oﬃcial chooses a she will be reelected with probability
xa). We then enquire whether the upper bound can be reached through an institution
that does not require such contractibility.
Suppose that the oﬃcial prefers action i over action j,w h e r ei,j∈{a,b}. She will select
her preferred action if
1 > δ(xj − xi),
and will pander if
1 < δ(xj − xi).
Note that, given her preferences, the oﬃcial’s incentive to pander does not depend on
whether she is congruent or not (this will no longer be true when we consider the case
q>0). That is, a congruent oﬃcial who prefers a has an objective function that is
identical to that of a noncongruent oﬃcial who prefers a. Following footnote 21 let us
13focus on Markov equilibrium, meaning that these two types of oﬃcials adopt the same
equilibrium behavior. Clearly, randomization or pandering by the oﬃcial will not be
welfare-maximizing; in all the equilibria we discuss below the oﬃcial chooses her preferred
action in period 1.
If δ < 1 the only possible improvement on RD and DD occurs when π <p . Then, for a
range of parameter values illustrated in Figure 1, the welfare-maximizing system consists
of RD in period 1 followed by an election in which the voters decide either to return
the incumbent to oﬃce (which, in equilibrium, will occur when the oﬃcial has chosen
the popular action) or else to hold a referendum on the second-period action (when the
oﬃcial has chosen the unpopular action). For δ > 1, improving on JP requires reducing
the diﬀerence xa − xb to deter pandering. Probabilities xa =1 /δ,x b =0constitute the
optimal choice. But contractibility is required for such randomization. In its absence, DD
or JP is optimal.
Proposition 1 Expected welfares from direct democracy and judicial power are
W
DD =2 p and W
JP =2 π.
When q =0(i.e., there is no feedback about the optimality of the oﬃcial’s ﬁrst-period
decision), welfare from representative democracy depends on the strength of the oﬃcial’s
oﬃce-holding motive (i.e., whether δ > 1 or δ < 1). When δ > 1,
W








and so representative democracy is dominated. Judicial power is superior to direct democ-
racies if and only if π >p .W h e nδ < 1,
W
RD = π[1 + π +2 p(1 − π)],
and so representative democracy dominates judicial power. Representative democracy is
superior to direct democracy for values of π and p such that (2) holds.
When δ > 1, no other system (except those requiring contractible probabilities) is better
than judicial power (if π >p ) or direct democracy (if π <p ). When δ < 1, the hybrid
14scheme (RD−DD)–in which there is a ﬁrst-period oﬃcial who runs for reelection and,
if defeated, is replaced by direct democracy–generates expected welfare
W
RD−DD = π +2 πp + p
2 − 2πp
2.
If p>π, then the hybrid is better than representative democracy and if p is not too much
greater than π, it is the welfare-maximizing system (in particular, it also better than direct
democracy; for the precise requirements on p and π,s e eF i g u r e1 ) .
C. Costly information acquisition
We have assumed that the oﬃcial is perfectly informed about the payoﬀ consequences
of actions a and b.S u p p o s en o wt h a ta c q u i r i n gs u c hi n f o r m a t i o ni ne a c hp e r i o de n t a i l sa
private cost c. That is, unless the oﬃcial incurs c, she has no better information than the
electorate. Assume that the oﬃcial’s gain G from selecting her preferred action satisﬁes
(3) (1 − p)G>c .
This inequality is a necessary condition for an oﬃcial under any system to acquire infor-
mation.
I nt h ec a s eo fjudicial power, this condition is also suﬃcient. However, it is not gener-
ally suﬃcient under representative democracy. This is because information is less valuable
to a politician who risks losing her job if she acts on it. Put diﬀerently, pandering does not
require costly information (the implicit assumption here is that the cost of ascertaining
public opinion is negligible relative to that of discovering the true consequences of a and
b).
To conﬁrm this logic, note that, under RD, a congruent oﬃcial will acquire information
only if
(4) p[G + β[G + R − c]] + (1 − p)G − c>p G+ β[G + R − c],
w h e r et h el e f t - h a n ds i d ei st h eo ﬃcial’s payoﬀ if she acquires information (and acts on it).
The corresponding condition for a noncongruent oﬃcial is always satisﬁed. It is easy to
verify that (4) is a more demanding constraint on G and c than (3). That is, if (4) holds
15(3) does too. If, as before, we take δ =
β(G+R)









Note that δ < 1 is no longer a suﬃcient condition to avert pandering.
We conclude that information acquisition about the consequences of public decisions
is less likely under representative democracy than under judicial power, a conclusion that
suggests that representative democracy will not accommodate technical decisions well.
By contrast, under representative democracy, we would expect politicians to expend
considerable resources to ascertain the prior beliefs of the electorate. Our model can be
generalized to allow the politician to be uncertain about the electorate’s view. In this
case, and if δ > 1, the politician will want to poll public opinion (provided the cost of
doing so is low enough) to know what the electorate actually favors. An unaccountable
oﬃcial would not incur such expenditures, which are socially wasteful in our model. To
sum up, accountability provides an incentive for wasteful information acquisition and
a disincentive for acquiring information about the optimal decision. However, because
our model assumes that learning the beliefs of the public is unrelated to determining
the optimal action, this summary perhaps exaggerates the case against representative
democracy.
D. Term lengths
We have been taking term lengths as exogenous. In particular, we have simply
assumed that a judge serves for two periods. But we might have supposed instead that
t h et e r mi so n l yo n ep e r i o dl o n g .
Actually, as the model stands, there is no diﬀerence (in welfare terms) between judges
serving one period or two: both deliver expected welfare 2π. But one reason for this
coincidence is that we have been assuming voters are essentially risk-neutral. Let us
now suppose instead that they are risk-averse.S p e c i ﬁcally, let V (2)(= 2),V (1),a n d
V (0)(= 0) be the utilities corresponding to two, one, and zero optimal decisions over two
periods, where V is a strictly concave function22. Then, two-period terms still produce
16expected welfare 2π, but one-period terms now generate welfare 2π2 +2 π(1 − π)V (1).
Thus, because V (1) > 1 (from risk aversion), one-period terms are better: it is less risky
to have two draws from the candidate pool than just one.
Of course, by this logic, we should replace oﬃcials as often as possible, which clearly
does not make sense. After all, there are set-up costs associated with every regime change,
not the least of which is the learning-by-doing that a new oﬃcial must undertake. The
optimal term length will, therefore, strike a balance between set-up costs and risk aver-
sion.23
E. Discretionary power
Judges and other nonaccountable oﬃcials typically have narrower spheres of ac-
tion and less discretionary power than accountable oﬃcials, such as legislators. Thus,
even such a powerful institution as the U.S. Supreme Court can consider only the cases
b r o u g h tb e f o r ei t ,a n d ,m o r e o v e r ,i ti sc o n s t r a i n e d( a tl e a s ti np r i n c i p l e )t od e c i d et h e m
according to the existing law or the Constitution. By contrast, the U.S. Congress can set
its own agenda and pass any law it wishes (although there may be a risk that the law will
be struck down by the Court). One might ask whether such diﬀerences can be explained
in our framework.
We cannot accommodate diﬀerent degrees of discretion in our basic two-action model,
but a simple extension allows us to do so. As before, let the social payoﬀsf r o mt h eo p t i m a l
and nonoptimal actions be 1 and 0, respectively. Introduce a status-quo alternative to
actions a and b. This status-quo action yields known social welfare σ∈[0,1]. The question
is whether an oﬃcial should be given the discretion to choose between a and b or be
required to stick with the status quo. The answer depends on the value of σ.D i s c r e t i o n
should be given to the oﬃcial if σ is smaller than some cutoﬀ σ∗.
Under judicial power,t h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fσ∗ is
σ
∗




Under representative democracy and assuming that the politician does not pander (oth-







Discretion confers a beneﬁt under representative democracy that is not available under
judicial power: it provides information that helps society weed out noncongruent oﬃcials.
Accordingly, elected oﬃcials should have more discretion than unelected ones.
F. Campaign Promises
In our model so far, the only information under RD that voters have about an
oﬃcial at the time of reelection is the action that she took in the ﬁrst period. But in real
elections, the electorate typically has more to go on than just the candidates’ records. In
particular, their campaign promises may be informative. Let us brieﬂy examine how the
analysis changes when candidates can make promises during the election after period 1
about what they would do in period 2. We suppose that, by that time, they know the
optimal second-period action.
If a promise implied no commitment, then, in our model, it would play no substantive
role at all. Regardless of her true intentions, a candidate would utter whatever helped
her to get reelected, and so such pronouncements would be worthless. Let us suppose
instead that if a candidate promises to take an action, then, when elected, she must carry
out that pledge (perhaps because the loss of face from not doing so would be too great).
Assume furthermore that challengers, as well as the incumbent, can make such promises.
There are two cases depending on whether or not candidates are willing to carry out
their nonpreferred actions simply to get elected25. If they are willing to do so, then, in
eﬀect, we obtain pandering in both periods (there cannot be an equilibrium in which
congruent and noncongruent oﬃcials are separated because the latter oﬃcials would have
the incentive to imitate the former merely to get elected).
In the case in which candidates pledge only their preferred actions, the electorate can
infer which action is optimal with high probability if there are suﬃc i e n t l ym a n yc a n d i -
dates: the optimal action will be promised by approximately a fraction p of candidates;
18the other action by approximately a fraction 1−p.26 Thus, with enough candidates, equi-
librium will entail the electorate selecting a candidate among those who have pledged the
“more promised” action (the action that a higher proportion of candidates have pledged
to carry out).
Thus, the welfare implications of campaign pledges depend critically on which case we
are in. In the former case, pledges lead to the deterioration of RD through pandering in
each period. But in the latter, welfare in both periods approaches the theoretical limit
of 1 as the number of candidates grows (this gets at the intuitive idea that the electorate
beneﬁts from political competition).
IV. Feedback
A. Forward-looking pandering
Let us now assume that parameter q is positive, so that with positive probability the
electorate learns before period 2 whether the ﬁrst-period action was optimal. Expected
welfares under direct democracy and judicial power are unchanged: under direct democ-
racy feedback is irrelevant since optimal decisions are independent across periods; under






Next consider representative democracy. Let xa and xb denote the (sequentially ra-
tional) equilibrium probabilities that the oﬃcial is retained in oﬃce when no feedback is
obtained. In the appendix we show that if the fraction of candidate oﬃcials with weak
oﬃce-holding motives (their δ is smaller than 1) is positive (even if arbitrarily small),
then, in the event of feedback, an oﬃcial is reelected in equilibrium if and only if she
chose the optimal action in period 1.
There are four possible “types” of oﬃcial in the ﬁrst-period. In particular, let (C,a)
correspond to a congruent oﬃcial when a is the optimal ﬁrst-period action (and hence the
19oﬃcial’s preferred action). Let (N,b) refer to a noncongruent oﬃcial when the optimal
action is b (so that the oﬃcial prefers a). (C,b)a n d( N,a)a r ed e ﬁned analogously. Let ∆
denote the diﬀerence between the oﬃcial’s payoﬀ from choosing a and that from choosing
b:
∆(C,a)=1 + δ[q +( 1− q)(xa − xb)]
∆(N,b)=1 + δ[−q +( 1− q)(xa − xb)]
∆(N,a)=−1+δ[q +( 1− q)(xa − xb)]
∆(C,b)= −1+δ[−q +( 1− q)(xa − xb)].
We have listed the four ∆s in descending order for the case δq<1.W h e nδq>1,t h e n
∆(N,a) ≥ ∆(N,b); the ranking is otherwise unchanged. It will make the analysis more
interesting to suppose throughout that δ > 1.27
There are three possible equilibria,28 two of which are mutually exclusive.
Full pandering equilibrium
As in section III, full pandering entails that the oﬃcial always selects the popular
action in equilibrium and is reelected if and only if she adheres to equilibrium. The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for such an equilibrium to exist is that ∆(C,b) ≥ 0
when xa =1and xb =0 ,t h a ti s ,
δ(1 − 2q) ≥ 1.
Thus, the oﬃcial must have a strong oﬃce-holding motive, and feedback must be suf-
ﬁciently slow. As noted in the previous section, FP makes representative democracy





In this next kind of equilibrium, the oﬃcial selects the optimal action in the ﬁrst
period regardless of her own preference. That is, types (C,a)a n d( N,a) select action
a and types (C,b)a n d( N,b)c h o o s ea c t i o nb. In the absence of feedback, the oﬃcial is
always reelected. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for such an equilibrium to exist is
20that ∆(N,b) ≤ ∆(N,a), or as we noted above,
δq ≥ 1.
We call the oﬃcial’s behavior in this equilibrium forward-looking pandering (FLP) to
reﬂect the fact that she is pandering not to the current electorate but rather to vot-
ers of the future who may have received feedback about her ﬁrst-period performance29.
FLP illustrates the disciplinary role traditionally attributed to elections in representa-
tive democracy (indeed, it constitutes a pure moral-hazard correcting eﬀect; there is no






In the appendix (Proposition A2) we show that if qδ > 1+δ
2 ,t h eunique limit of perfect
Bayesian equilibria as the proportion ρ of oﬃcials with weak oﬃce-holding motive tends
to zero is the FLP equilibrium in which an oﬃcial is reelected if and only if either (i) there
is feedback and she has chosen the optimal action or (ii) there is no feedback and she has
chosen action a. Furthermore, Proposition A3 shows that if 1+δ
2 >q δ > 1,t h e nt h eo n l y
two possible limits as ρ → 0 are an FLP equilibrium in which, if there is no feedback, the
electorate randomizes over reelection (this limit always exisits for this range of parameter




then FLP is no longer an equilibrium. The only equilibrium possibility (other than full
pandering) is that types (C,a)a n d( N,b) select action a,t y p e( C,b) selects action b,a n d
type (N,a) selects her preferred action b with probability y and panders with probability
1 − y,w h e r e
π(1 − p)







Thus (N,a) sometimes panders, but the other three types never do.
To compute social welfare in this partial pandering (PP) equilibrium, note that the
electorate is indiﬀerent between replacing the oﬃcial and keeping her, regardless of her
ﬁrst-period behavior (because, after either choice of action, the conditional probability
t h a ts h ei sc o n g r u e n ti sπ). So second-period welfare always equals π. Overall welfare is
therefore:
[π +( 1− π)p(1 − y)] + π =[ π +( 1− π)(2p − 1)] + π
>W JP.
The PP equilibrium generates greater welfare than JP in the ﬁrst period: either an
oﬃcial chooses her preferred action (as in JP) or, if noncongruent (more speciﬁcally, if of
type (N,a)), possibly panders (which enhances welfare). PP also generates greater welfare
than JP in the second period: if there is no feedback after the ﬁrst period, the two are
t h es a m e . B u ti ft h e r eis feedback, PP improves the likelihood of a congruent oﬃcial,
since noncongruent oﬃcials are more likely to be thrown out of oﬃce. Notice that the PP
equilibrium incorporates both adverse-selection-correcting and moral-hazard-correcting
eﬀects. In the appendix, we show (Proposition A4) that when δ > 1 and qδ < 1, one limit
of perfect Bayesian equilibria as the proportion ρ of oﬃcials with no oﬃce-holding motive
goes to zero is a PP equilibrium.30 The only other possible limit (if δ(1 − 2q) ≥ 1)i st h e
full-pandering equilibrium.
To summarize, we have:
Proposition 2 Suppose that oﬃcials’ oﬃce-holding motives are strong (δ > 1). Feedback
(q>0) creates scope for socially beneﬁcial forward-looking pandering 31(when δq ≥ 1)o r
partial pandering (when δq<1) and eliminates full pandering when δ(1−2q) < 1.T h e s e
three sorts of equilibria are the only limiting possibilities when the proportion of oﬃcials
with weak oﬃce-holding motives is sent to zero.
Thus, the equilibria of this model exhibit the full range of potential beneﬁts from
22accountability. In the absence of feedback (q =0 , section III), the reelection process helps
counteract adverse selection but does nothing to solve the moral-hazard problem: either
δ > 1, in which case the politician panders and representative democracy is dominated;
or δ < 1, in which case behavior is the same as without accountability, and elections
merely oﬀer the prospect of removing noncongruent oﬃcials. With rapid enough feedback
(δq>1) the forward-looking pandering equilibrium exists and completely solves the
moral hazard problem in the ﬁrst period, but does not help against adverse selection.
With moderately fast feedback (δq<1,q > 0) the partial-pandering equilibrium exists
and to some extent counteracts both moral hazard and adverse selection.
B. Performance measurement within government
We have seen that an increase in the quality q of performance measurement can boost
the case for representative democracy. Indeed, there is a potential advantage from raising
q beyond the direct beneﬁt of inducing a forward-looking or partial-pandering equilibrium.
We have been taking the pool of potential oﬃcials as given exogenously. But in practice it
will depend on the cost a candidate incurs from running for oﬃce and her expected payoﬀ
from holding oﬃce. Notice that moving from full panderi n gt of o r w a r d - l o o k i n go rp a r t i a l
pandering raises the payoﬀ for congruent oﬃcials and reduces that for noncongruent oﬃ-
cials. Thus, through the self-selection it promotes, such a move is likely to improve the
composition of the pool.
We have assumed that q is exogenous, but institutional design in practice aﬀects perfor-
mance measurement. Of particular interest here is the creation of independent evaluation
boards (e.g., the U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce) to write detailed opinions about the per-
formance of elected oﬃcials (e.g., the budget designers). Such evaluation boards do not
share control with elected oﬃcials. Rather, they perform an advisory or monitoring role.
They can be viewed as raising the quality q of the electorate’s performance measurement.
Although we often take such institutions for granted, we might enquire into their
rationale: why is the monitor most often32 an unaccountable body? And why are the
evaluated oﬃcials generally accountable?
23The answer to the latter question is straightforward in our model: improved perfor-
mance measurement pays oﬀ only if the evaluee is accountable. Indeed, the eﬀect of
performance measurement grows with the degree of accountability.
The former question is more challenging. A tentative answer could be that if an oﬃcial
has the incentive to pander to the electorate, then so might an accountable monitor. In
that case, the introduction of monitors would do little to expose panderers.
V. Tyranny of the majority
We now relax the assumption of a homogeneous electorate in order to investigate
minority politics. We will argue that, relative to JP, representative democracy gives more
weight to the majority and is therefore more likely to undervalue the minority interests.
The tyranny of the majority is an old theme of political thought. We have already
quoted Madison on this point. In the Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton proposed
that the judiciary should control the encroachments and oppressions of the representative
body and that insulating it from accountability is important for this role:
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will aﬀord
a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial oﬃces, since nothing
will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which
must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
Still, despite the risks that RD poses for minority rights, we will suggest that it safeguards
them better than direct democracy (recall Butler and Ranney (1994) on the pitfalls of
democracy; see footnote 5).
We introduce a variant of the basic model in which there are two groups, the majority
and the minority. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the majority knows that
action a is its optimal choice. Similarly, the minority knows that action b is best for it.
What is not known is which action maximizes overall welfare. With probability x the
majority should prevail, because action a imposes only a small negative externality on
24the minority; let B>0 be the overall social beneﬁto fa c t i o na over action b in that case
(we normalize social welfare under action b to be 0). With probability 1−x,t h em i n o r i t y
should prevail: action a imposes a large externality on the minority and generates overall
net loss L>0 relative to action b. B can be interpreted as the social loss when the
minority blocks a socially desirable move, whereas L is the social loss from a move that
oppresses the minority.
Finally, we assume that there are three types of oﬃcials: those who are congruent
with the majority (labeled “M”and having probability πM); those who are congruent
with the minority (labeled “m” and having probability πm) ;and those who balance the
two groups’ interests and so have preferences in line with social welfare ( labeled “W”a n d
having probability πW). The preferences of the three types of oﬃcials are summarized in
table 1.
Let us look at the welfare implications of our three benchmark institutions:
Direct democracy: Under DD, the majority always prevails, and so per-period social
welfare is
xB − (1 − x)L.
Judicial power: A nonaccountable oﬃcial selects her preferred policy, and so per-period
25welfare under JP is
πM [xB − (1 − x)L]+πm[0] + πW[xB].
As one would expect, direct democracy fares better relative to judicial power when the
loss from the externality is small (L small) or unlikely (x large), and when oﬃcials tend
to be biased toward interest groups (πW low).
Representative democracy: The analysis of RD is similar to that of section III. Let us
b e g i nw i t ht h ep a n d e r i n gc a s eδ > 1. In that case, even a W oﬃcial who knows that the
minority should prevail prefers to cater to the majority in period 1. As in section III,
RD delivers the same outcome as DD in period 1 and the same as JP in period 2. It is
therefore dominated.
Next suppose that δ < 1, so that there is no pandering. Action a is chosen by an M
oﬃcial and, with probability x,b yaW oﬃcial. Action b is selected by an M oﬃcial and,
with probability 1 − x,b yaW oﬃcial. Thus, the majority will not reelect an oﬃcial
who has chosen b, and so representative democracy weeds out M and (less eﬀectively) W
oﬃcials.
Proposition 3 For all δ
(i) There exist thresholds x∗ and x∗∗ (x∗ <x ∗∗ for δ < 1, x∗ = x∗∗ for δ > 1,w h e r e
0 <x ∗ ≤ x∗∗ < 1)s u c ht h a t
if x<x ∗,J Pi so p t i m a l ,
if x∗ ≤ x ≤ x∗∗,R Di so p t i m a l ,
if x∗∗ <x , DD is optimal,
where x is the probability that the majority should prevail.







































L,D Di so p t i m a l ,
where B/L is the ratio of the welfare loss from minority blocking to that from majority
oppression.
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WDD, WJP and WRD are increasing in x. WJP is the highest of the three for x =0 ,






w∗ >w DD = wJP.
Thus, for low values of x or B/L, JP is optimal; these are the ranges for which minority
rights are most important, and RD and DD lead to the majority-preferred decision too
often. For moderate values of x or B/L,R Di so p t i m a l ;R Di sb e t t e rt h a nD Db e c a u s ei t
entails some chance that the decision will be taken by an m or W oﬃcial. But RD does
not overweight these oﬃcials this bias like JP. Finally, for high values of x or B/L,D D
is optimal (since, in this section, we assume away imperfect knowledge about the optimal
action on the part of the electorate, we might as well let the majority decide directly if
the minority stands to lose relatively little).
The Constitution as a decision allocating device
Proposition 3 suggests a possible interpretation of the the U.S. Constitution. Let
us suppose that x is rarely so high that DD is desirable. Then, it becomes desirable to
distinguish between those cases in which x is (moderately) high (so that RD is optimal)
and those in which x is low (JP is optimal).
The Constitution provides a means of making this distinction operational. If a decision
bears on some Constitutional guarantee, this is a sign that x is low, i.e., that a minority’s
rights are in jeopardy. And, indeed, the decision mechanism in such a case is to assign
the decision to the Federal courts, the embodiment of judicial power. In the absence of
a Constitutional issue, however, the presumption is that x is not especially low, and the
policy decision remains in the realm of representative democracy.
27VI. Summary and avenues for further research
The paper’s main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows:
(1) Accountability has two potential beneﬁts. It allows voters to remove oﬃcials whose
interests appear to be noncongruent with the electorate, but also gives noncongruent
oﬃcials some incentive to act as though they were congruent (through the eﬀect of forward-
looking or partial pandering).
(2) However accountability may encourage oﬃcials to pander to the electorate and over-
look minority interests.
(3) Nonaccountability is most desirable when (a) the electorate is poorly informed about
the optimal action, (b) acquiring decision-relevant information is costly, (c) feedback about
the quality of decisons is slow. Therefore, technical decisions, in particular, may be best
allocated to judges or appointed bureaucrats.
(4) The most important decisions should be taken by elected rather than nonaccountable
oﬃcials (although direct democracy may have the edge over representative democracy for
such decisions).
(5) The discretion of nonaccountable oﬃcials should be more limited than that of ac-
countable ones.
(6) Nonaccountability is preferable when the majority’s preferences are very likely to
inﬂict large negative externalities on the minority. However, representative democracy
is better in this case than direct democracy, and, for moderate probabilities of negative
externalities, may constitute a desirable compromise between the two extremes.
This paper is only a ﬁrst step in the analysis of how constitutional design aﬀects
public choices. Many other issues of interest come to mind. First, extending the model
to more than two periods would lead to a richer set of feasible institutions. For example,
in a four-period model, the policy of giving an oﬃcial an initial tenure of two periods
28and then making her mandate renewable by vote in each of the last two periods can be
shown to make some sense. Second, the analysis could be extended to an international
context; we could get at the idea that elected oﬃcials may have a harder time establishing
credibility internationally (e.g., in arms talks or in negotiating with the IMF) because of
their incentive to pander domestically. That is, pandering to multiple audiences may be
diﬃcult. Third, we could study alternative nomination processes for judges and agency
commissioners rather than maintain our current assumption that they are simply selected
at random. Fourth, we could enrich the model to allow for the possibility that campaign
contributions aﬀect politicians’ choices. Fifth, the model could be extended to allow
elected oﬃcials to “pass the buck” by calling for a public referendum. Finally, some
of our analysis might be applied to the media. People often read newspapers or watch
television networks that conﬁrm their prejudices; in other words, the media pander in
much the same way that politicians do.
We hope that these extensions and others will be pursued in future research.
29Appendix
We shall suppose that there is a small proportion ρ of oﬃcials with weak oﬃce-holding
motives (so that they will choose actions in the ﬁrst period according to their true pref-
erences). Call these the ideological oﬃcials. A proportion π of these are congruent; the
remainder 1 − π are noncongruent.
Proposition A1 When δ > 1 and q =0 , the unique pure-strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of RD in the limit when ρ → 0 is a pure pandering equilibrium in which the
oﬃcial always chooses a in period 1 and is reelected if and only if she chooses a.T h e
same conclusion holds for mixed-strategy equilibria if we impose the Markov requirement
of footnote 21.
Proof. Throughout assume that ρ > 0. Suppose, contrary to the proposition,
there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which all types of nonideological oﬃcials choose
b in period 1. Then the choice of a will lead the electorate to believe that the chooser
is an ideological congruent oﬃcial with probability πp/[πp +( 1− π)(1− p)] > π and so
will reelect her. By contrast, the choice of b will lead the electorate to believe that the
oﬃcial is noncongruent with probability exceeding 1 − π, and so will not reelect. Thus,
nonideological type (C,a) cannot choose b in period 1 after all.
Suppose next that there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which some nonideolog-
ical types choose a and others choose b. Then, for ρ suﬃciently small, the probability of
an oﬃcial’s being congruent conditional on her choosing a in the ﬁrst period will either
be strictly greater than π or strictly less than π. In the former case, an oﬃcial will be
reelected if and only if she chose a, and in the latter if and only if she chose b. So, in either
case, all nonideological oﬃcials will have the incentive to behave the same way (in order
to get reelected), a contradiction. Thus the proposition is established for pure-strategy
equilibria.
Next, allow for mixed strategy equilibria but impose the Markov requirement. Suppose
that at least one type of nonideological oﬃcal chooses a with positive probability in
equilibrium. Because δ > 1 note that the (C,a) and (N,b) types have a stronger preference
30for a over b than do the (C,b) and (N,a) types. Hence, in equilibrium, the former group
chooses a with at least as high probability as the latter group. Furthermore, from the
Markov assumption, the (C,a) and (N,b) types must play a with the same probability.
Similarly the (C,b) and (N,a) oﬃcials must play a with the same probability. Thus, since
the proportion of (C,a)st o(N,b)si sπp/(1 − π)(1− p) (> π/(1 − π)), the electorate
will attach a probability greater than π to the oﬃcial’s being congruent if a is chosen and
so will reelect her. [This is so even if the (C,b) and (N,a) types choose a with probability
1, because in this case, the ideological oﬃcials will tip the balance in favor of reelection].
Symmetrically, an oﬃcial will fail to be reelected if she chooses b.
Because oﬃcials are reelected if and only if they choose a, nonideological oﬃcials will
opt for a,s i n c eδ > 1.
Proposition A2 When qδ > 1+δ
2 , the unique limit of perfect Bayesian equilibria as ρ → 0
is an FLP equilibrium in which an oﬃcial is reelected if and only if she has chosen (i) the
optimal action when there is feedback or (ii) action a if there is no feedback.
Proof. We claim ﬁrst that, in equilibrium with ρ > 0, if the electorate obtains
feedback about an oﬃcial’s ﬁrst-period choice, the oﬃcial will be reelected if and only if
the decision was optimal.
To see this, suppose that a is the chosen decision and that the electorate has learned
that it is optimal. If, in equilibrium, no type of nonideological oﬃcial chooses a with
positive probability when a i so p t i m a l ,t h ee l e c t o r a t ew i l li n f e rf r o mt h ef e e d b a c kt h a ta
congruent ideological oﬃcial has chosen a, and so will reelect. Similarly, if in equilibrium
some type of nonideological oﬃcial chooses a with positive probability, when a is optimal,
then the probability that (C,a) chooses a must be at least as big as the probability that
(N,a) does so (since (C,a)’s preference for a is stronger than that of (N,a)). Thus, if
it incorporates the possibility of a congruent ideological oﬃcial, the probability that an
oﬃcial is congruent conditional on a having been chosen and revealed optimal is strictly
greater than π, and so the electorate will again reelect the oﬃcial.
Suppose instead that a has been revealed to be nonoptimal. If, in equilibrium, no non-
31ideological type chooses a with positive probability when a is nonoptimal, the electorate
will infer from the feedback that a noncongruent ideological oﬃcial has chosen a,a n ds o
will not reelect. Similarly, if, in equilibrium, some nonideological oﬃcial chooses a with
positive probability when a is nonoptimal, then the probability that (N,b) chooses a must
be at least as big as that that (C,b) does so (since (N,b)’s preference for a is stronger
than that of (C,b)). Thus, including the possibility of a noncongruent ideological oﬃcial,
the probability that an oﬃcial is noncongruent conditional on a having been chosen and
revealed nonoptimal is strictly greater than 1 − π, and so the electorate will not reelect
the oﬃcial, establishing the claim for a.T h ea r g u m e n tf o rb is entirely symmetric.
Now consider a nonideological type (N,b) oﬃcial. If she chooses b,h e rp a y o ﬀ,f r o mt h e
a b o v ec l a i m ,i sa tl e a s tδq. If instead she chooses a,h e rp a y o ﬀ is at most 1+δ(1 − q).B u t ,
by hypothesis, the former exceeds the latter. Hence, in equilibrium, type (N,b) cannot
choose b, and the same for (C,b) (since (C,b)’s preference for b is even stronger). Similarly,
types (N,a) and (C,a) choose a in equilibrium, establishing that any equilibrium must
be FLP.
Suppose that a has been chosen in the ﬁrst period. In equilibrium, nonideological types
(C,a) and (N,a) and ideological types (C,a) and (N,b) choose a. Hence, if there has been
no feedback, the probability that the oﬃcial is congruent conditional on the choice of a
is strictly greater than π, and so she will be reelected. Similarly, she will not be reelected
if she has chosen b and there is no feedback
Proposition A3 When 1+δ
2 >q δ > 1,o n el i m i to fP B E sa sρ → 0 is an FLP equilibrium
in which, if there is no feedback, the electorate randomizes over reelection. The only other
possible limit (if δ(1 − 2q) ≥ 1) is a full pandering equilibrium.
Proof. Fix ρ > 0. From the proof of Proposition A2, in any equilibrium, if the
electorate obtains feedback about an oﬃcial’s ﬁrst-period choice, then the oﬃcial will be
reelected if and only if the decision was optimal. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium
in which nonideological type (N,a) chooses b with positive probability. Then, (N,b) and
(C,b) both choose b with probability 1 (since for δq>1 their preference for b is even
32stronger than that of (N,a)). Hence, without feedback (and in view of the ideological
types (N,a) and (C,b) who choose b), the probability that an oﬃcial is noncongruent
conditional on b having been chosen is strictly greater than 1 − π,a n ds oa no ﬃcial who
chooses b will not be reelected. This means that (N,a)’s payoﬀ from choosing b is 1. By
contrast, if she chooses a, she will be reelected (whether or not there is feedback), and so
her payoﬀ will be δ, which, by hypothesis, is greater, a contradiction. We conclude that
(N,a) must choose a with probability 1 in equilibrium, which implies that the same is
true of (C,a).
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which nonideological type (N,b) chooses
b with probability 1. In that case, the probability without feedback that an oﬃcial is
noncongruent conditional on her having chosen b is strictly greater than 1 − π (thanks
to the fact that, in the absence of feedback, the probability that an ideological oﬃcial is
noncongruent conditional on her having chosen b is strictly greater than 1 − π), and so
(N,b)’s payoﬀ from b is δq. By contrast, if she chooses a, she will be reelected if there is
no feedback, and so her payoﬀ will be 1+δ(1 − q), which, by hypothesis, is greater, a
contradiction. We conclude that, in any equilibrium, (N,b) must choose a with positive
probability.
Consider an equilibrium in which nonideological type (N,b) randomizes between a and
b.T h e n
δq + δ(1 − q)β =1+δ(1 − q)α, (1)
where the left- and right-hand sides of (1) correspond to the payoﬀsf r o mb and a respec-
tively, and β and α are the probabilities of reelection in the absence of feedback when,
respectively, b and a have been chosen. From (1) and hypothesis, we obtain
1 > α − β > 0.
That is, when there is no feedback, the electorate must randomize between reelecting and
not reelecting, either when the oﬃcial has chosen a, or when she has chosen b (or in both
cases). This implies that the probability of an oﬃcial’s being congruent conditional on a
33having been chosen is π. Now, the nonideological types other than (N,b) who choose a in
equilibrium are (C,a) and (N,a) and the ideological types are (C,a) and (N,b). Hence,
the probability that (N,b) chooses a must be only big enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of the
ideological oﬃcials. Thus, as ρ → 0, equilibrium converges to one in which (N,b) (and
hence (C,b))p l a y sb with probability 1 – i.e., an FLP equilibrium – and the electorate
randomizes over reelection when there is no signal, as the Proposition claims.
The only remaining equilibrium possibility is that nonideological type (N,b) chooses
a with probability 1. Now, if (C,b) does so too, then we are done, because this will be a
pure pandering equilibrium. Hence, assume that (C,b) chooses b with positive probability.
If this probability is high enough to outweigh the eﬀect of the ideological type (N,a),w h o
chooses b, then, without feedback, an oﬃcial who chooses b will be reelected, implying
that (N,b)’s payoﬀ from b is δ, whereas that from a is only 1, a contradiction of the
fact that (N,b) chooses a. We conclude that the probability that (C,b) chooses b must
be suﬃciently small and converge to 0 as ρ → 0. Thus, in the limit, we obtain a full
pandering equilibrium, as claimed.
Proposition A4 When δ > 1 and 0 <q δ < 1,o n el i m i to fP B E sa sρ → 0 is a
PP equilibrium (which is also a Markov equilibrium). The only other possible limit (if
δ(1 − 2q) ≥ 1) is a full pandering equilibrium.
Proof. Fix ρ > 0. Again, it can be shown that, in any equilibrium, an oﬃcial
is reelected when there is feedback if and only her ﬁrst-period decision was optimal.
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which nonideological type (N,a) chooses b
with probability 1. Then the probability that an oﬃcial is noncongruent conditional on
her having chosen b is greater than 1 − π, and so, without feedback, an oﬃcial choosing
b will not be reelected. Thus, (N,a)’s payoﬀ from b is 1, whereas her payoﬀ from a is δ,
a contradiction, since the latter is bigger. We conclude that nonideological type (N,a)
must choose a with positive probability in equilibrium. If she also chooses b with positive
probability, then, since 0 <q δ < 1 implies that ∆(C,a) > ∆(N,b) > ∆(N,a) > ∆(C,b),
type ∆(C,b) will choose b and types (C,a) and (N,b) will choose a : the equilibrium is
34PP. Notice that because all four types have diﬀerent preferences, this is also a Markov
equilibrium.
Assume, therefore, that (N,a) chooses a with probability 1. Now if nonideological
type (C,b) chooses b with high enough probability to outweigh the eﬀect of the congruent
ideological types (C,b) and (N,a),w h oc h o o s eb, then, without feedback, an oﬃcial who
chooses b will be reelected, implying that (N,a)’s payoﬀ from b is 1+( 1− q)δ,w h e r e a s
that from a is δq. But, by hypothesis, the former is bigger than the latter, a contradiction.
We conclude that nonideological type (C,b) can choose b with probability at most on the
order of ρ.B u t a s ρ → 0, (C,b)’s strategy converges to one in which a is chosen with
probability 1, implying that the limiting equilibrium is full pandering.
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1. Ballot referendums constitute the largest class of decisions made through direct democ-
racy, but even in the U.S. and Switzerland, where they are especially popular, they touch
on only a small fraction of public policy issues.
2. See, however, the sympathetic fourteen-page survey on direct democracy in The Econo-
mist (December 21, 1996). Many have argued that once the digital divide is eliminated,
e-voting will enhance the appeal of referendums.
3. The view that governments are better informed than citizens is emphasized in James
Madison (1787) and Abbé Siéyès (1789) (see also the introduction to Bernard Manin,
1997).
4. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) puts it in characteristically acerbic fashion: “The average
citizen expends less disciplined eﬀort on mastering a political problem than he expends
on a game of bridge.”
405. Summarizing the case against direct democracy, David Butler and Austin Ranney
(1994) write:
The main arguments against holding referendums in representative democra-
cies include: (1) ordinary citizens have neither the analytical skills nor the
information to make wise decisions; (2) decisions by elected oﬃcials involve
weighing the intensity of preferences and melding the legitimate interests of
many groups into policies that will give all groups something of what they
want; (3) decisions made by representatives are more likely to protect the
rights of minorities; and (4) by allowing elected oﬃcials to be bypassed and
by encouraging oﬃcials to evade divisive issues by passing them on to the
voters, referendums weaken the prestige and authority of representatives and
representative government.” (pages 17-18).
We have already touched on points (1) and (3), and these will ﬁgure prominently in our
analysis.
6. For example, the “great things” she does might consist of favors for a particular interest
group, in which case her legacy beneﬁts could include what the interest group does for
her in return.
7. The desire to hold oﬃce is a commonly assumed motive in the political economy
literature dating back to Robert Barro (1975) and John Ferejohn (1986). It is our legacy
motive that is nonstandard (although, we believe, quite realistic).
8. Opinions diﬀered in the 1787 U.S. Constitutional convention on the degree to which
oﬃcials should be responsive to public opinion. In this paper, however, we take the view
of delegate George Clymer (see Charles Beard 1913, p 193), who wrote that “ a repre-
sentative of the people is appointed to think for and not with his constituents.” In doing
so, we adopt the usual political-science deﬁnition of “representative democracy ” as a
system in which voters do not instruct their representatives. The practice of instructing
41representatives was widespread in the 18th century (e.g., deputies to the Estates General
in France, American states before the 1787 Constitution). The modern version of rep-
resentative democracy gained acceptance in the 18th century in England, and with the
1787 Constitution in the US and the 1789 revolution in France. See Manin (1997, chapter
5) for more details.
9. Received theories of democracy in political science, e.g., Robert Dahl (1956), often
stress the importance of repeated elections for making government responsive to the pub-
lic. We argue that “moral-hazard-correcting” responsiveness is beneﬁcial, whereas simply
carrying out what the public wants can be counterproductive.
10. We use the term “judicial power” to refer to nonaccountable oﬃcials because, in most
democracies, judges–at least, at the highest levels–are appointed rather than elected.
In the U.S., for example, all Federal judges are appointed and with lifetime tenure. Most
of what we say about “judges,” however, applies equally well to appointed government
bureaucrats whose tenure is not appreciably aﬀected by their actions.
Interestingly (and consistent with the theory developed here) elected judges in the
U.S. appear to “pander” more (and thus behave more like politicians) than their ap-
pointed counterparts. Speciﬁcally, Besley and Abigail Payne (2003) analyze employment-
discrimination cases and ﬁnd that in states where judges are subject to reelection discrim-
mination charges are ﬁled at a higher rate. They attribute this ﬁnding to an incentive
rather than a selection eﬀect, i.e., elected judges are likely to be more generous in awarding
damages. (And among states with appointed judges, those where judges serve life terms–
so need not worry about reappointment–have even fewer discrimmination charges ﬁled.)
Relatedly, Besley and Coate (2000a) show that electricity prices paid by retail consumers
are lower in those U.S. states that elect regulators. The literature also provides evidence
(reviewed in Besley and Ann Case 2003) that U.S. Governors subject to term limits behave
diﬀerently from those who are not.
11. As we have already noted, there is evidence from the empirical literature that elected
42and appointed oﬃcials behave diﬀerently. In addition to the articles cited in footnote
10, work by Henning Bohn and Robert Inman (1996) and Andrew Hansen (1999), (2000)
suggests that elected judges (whom we would call “politicians”) are more independent
than appointed judges.
12. Moral hazard is the only informational imperfection in models following the Barro-
Ferejohn tradition. The absence of adverse selection implies that voters learn nothing
about an oﬃcial from her behavior, and thus are indiﬀerent about whether or not to
reelect her. Thus disciplining her relies on a particular resolution of this indiﬀerence.
13. Gilat Levy (2000) shows that a careerist judge overturns precedent more than is
socially eﬃcient, as such behavior is a signal of the judge’s ability. That paper also looks
at the interaction between this incentive and endogenous appeals.
14. We can accommodate heterogeneous preferences as long as they are such that maxi-
mizing overall welfare is the same as maximizing the welfare of the median voter. Thus,
in the basic model, we are supposing that the welfare of a minority cannot outweigh that
of its complement.
15. In the case of a heterogenous electorate, p denotes the median voter’s uncertainty
about a;i ti snot to be interpreted as the fraction of voters who think a is optimal.
16. We will assume that constitutional dictates cannot be evaded. For a discussion of
this assumption, see Barry R. Weingast (1997).
17. With a heterogeneous electorate (see footnotes 14 and 15), the congruent oﬃcial can be
thought of as representing the interests of the median voter, whereas the “noncongruent”
oﬃcial represents some other group of voters.
18. We are supposing that the preferences of the congruent oﬃcial are perfectly aligned
with the interests of the electorate, while those of the noncongruent oﬃcial are diametri-
cally opposed. Without any change in the qualitative results, we could relax this assump-
43tion, so that the noncongruent oﬃcial simply had a higher probability than the congruent
oﬃcial of being at variance with the electorate in both periods.
19. The assumption that this utility accrues only if the oﬃcial herself selects the action
captures the legacy motivation.
20. The model can be extended to an overlapping generations framework with two-period-
lived oﬃcials. The challenger’s incentives are then similar to those of the incumbent one
period earlier. Since our focus is on the incumbent’s behavior, our simpler two-period
model involves little loss of generality (but see footnotes 29 and 31).
21. FP is not the only equilibrium, but we claim that it is the most reasonable one to
focus on. The only other pure-strategy equilibrium is that in which the oﬃcial always
chooses b (the unpopular action). However, this “unpopular pandering” equilibrium is not
robust to a small perturbation to the pool of candidate oﬃcials. Speciﬁcally, suppose that
we introduce a small proportion ρ of oﬃcials who have weak oﬃce-holding motives (their
discount factor is lower than 1): a fraction π of these are congruent, the rest noncongruent.
In the appendix, we show (see Proposition A1) that, for ρ > 0, the FP equilibrium of the
text is the unique equilibrium in which the oﬃcial does not randomize.
Finally, although there are mixed-strategy equilibria in which the oﬃcial randomizes
between a and b, each of these is non-Markovian in the sense that there are two diﬀerent
states (i.e., two realizations of the uncertainty about the oﬃcial’s congruence and action
a’s optimality) in which all actors have exactly the same preferences and yet behave
diﬀerently in the two states. These equilbria are, therefore, eliminated by the requirement
that equilibrium strategies be Markovian (see Proposition A1).
22. That V be concave is not the only reasonable possibility. If, for example, the payoﬀ
from an optimal decision in the ﬁrst period were enhanced by an optimal second-period
decision, then V might be convex.
23. When oﬃcials are accountable an additional consideration enters the picture: the
44length of term will aﬀect their incentive to pander. Because this factor is more compli-
c a t e d ,w ew i l ln o tt a k ei tu ph e r e .
24. We assume here that the status quo, if chosen, is selected for two periods.
25. In our basic model, an oﬃcial always gets nonnegative utility (either R or G+R)f r o m
holding oﬃce. However, we can generalize this set-up to allow for the possibility that an
oﬃcial who chooses her nonpreferred action derives negative utility overall, in which case
she would not promise that action simply to get elected.
26. If there is a cost to making campaign pledges, then some candidates who prefer the
nonoptimal action may refrain from making pledges at all, since they are unlikely to be
elected.
27. For δ < 1, the possibility of feedback does not alter the oﬃcial’s ﬁrst-period behavior:
she always chooses her preferred action. But feedback allows the electorate to learn with
certainty w h e t h e ro rn o tt h eo ﬃcial is congruent.
28. Here we are assuming that, as in footnote 21, a small proportion of oﬃcials who have
weak oﬃce-holding motives are introduced and this proportion is then sent to zero.
29. If we instead adopted an overlapping-generations framework, the oﬃcial would no
longer always choose the optimal action in equilibrium, even in the case δq ≥ 1.I n s t e a d
we would obtain an equilibrium very much like what we call partial pandering (see footnote
31).
30. In section III, we rule out equilibrium in which the oﬃcial randomizes by appealing to
Markov equilibrium (see footnote 21 and Proposition A1). Although partial pandering
entails randomization by the oﬃcial, it is consistent with the Markovian requirement
because, once q>0, the diﬀerent types of oﬃcial no longer have the same preferences
31. In footnote 29, we noted that if we used an overlapping-generations model instead of
our two-period, once-oﬀ framework, we would no longer obtain a FLP even in the case
45δq>1. Instead, we would get a PP equilibrium in which (i) types (C,a), (C,b), and
(N,b) choose their preferred actions, (ii) type (N,a) panders with probability y,a n d( i i i )
the oﬃcial is reelected only when there is feedback that she chose the optimal ﬁrst-period
action.
32. To be sure, there also exist Congressional investigation committees in the U.S..
46